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Risks to health and the NHS in the post-Brexit era
Trade deals negotiated as the next part of the Brexit processwill have big implications for healthcare,
and we need greater transparency sayMay van Schalkwyk and colleagues
May C I van Schalkwyk, 1 Holly Jarman, 2 Tamara Hervey, 3 Olivier J Wouters, 4 Pepita Barlow, 4
Martin McKee1
When it formally left the EU in January 2020, the UK
entered the next stage of the Brexit process. This
second phase—the transition period—is more
demanding than the first. It involves the UK
implementing the withdrawal agreement and
negotiating trade deals with both the EU and US as
part of its post-Brexit global free trade agenda,
“Global Britain.”
The UK needs to secure a trade deal with the EU to
avoid a no deal Brexit at the end of the transition
period. Tradepolicy influences products and services
that are potentially beneficial or harmful to health,
and this means that the decisions made during this
phase will have important implications for health
and the NHS.
Amid the covid-19pandemic, theadditional challenge
of implementing large scale changes to UK trading
arrangements is of great concern. Unsurprisingly,
calls have been made for an extension to the
transition period and for US-UK trade negotiations
to be delayed. However, the UK government seems
committed to ending the transition period on 31
December 2020, anda twoweek roundofUS-UK trade
negotiations beginning on 5 May 2020 took place.
Both the US and the UK have stated that a strong
trading relationship is important to recovery from the
pandemic.1 The effects of the pandemic on the
negotiations are difficult to predict. This is
complicated by theuncertainty surrounding theUK’s
future trading relationship with the EU and the
upcoming US presidential election.2
The unsuccessful negotiations on a Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between
the EU and US suggest that the UK-US trade
discussions will not only raise many controversial
issues but also attract thosewith vested interestswho
seek to influence the outcomes of such agreements.3
The UK will be under great pressure to agree a trade
deal that favours corporate interests, and especially
those of the pharmaceutical industry, over public
health (box 1). Fundamentally, the UK must choose
how closely it wishes to align with, or diverge from,
the US on these issues.
Box 1: What is on the table in the negotiations?
Early concerns about the consequences for the NHS of
a potential trade deal with the US centred on US
healthcare corporations taking over large parts of the
NHS, summarised in thewords, “NHSnot for sale.”Such
concerns can be questioned given the limited scope for
extracting profit from the relatively cheapNHS, although
there is scope for carving out profitable niche markets
such as some forms of elective surgery.4 Instead,
attentionhas turned towhatmight happen todrugprices,
which are much cheaper in Europe than in the US.5 6
Responding to these concerns, theUK’s secretary of state
for trade said that “The government has been clear that…
the price the NHS pays for drugs will not be on the table.
The services the NHS provides will not be on the table.
We will not agree measures which undermine the
government’s ability to deliver on our manifesto
commitments to the NHS.”7
Yet, like many aspects of Brexit, there is much more
clarity about what the British government does not want
than what it does. The US position is clearer. President
Trump has argued that the high drug prices charged to
US patients are subsidising the costs of medicines in
Europe and other parts of the world.8 In its written
submission to the request for comments on negotiating
objectives for a US-UK Trade Agreement issued by the
Office of theUSTradeRepresentative, thePharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA, the
industry’s main trade group in the US) called for “the
negotiation of a comprehensive and ambitious trade
agreement between the US and the UK.”9
PhRMA presented the current US trade deficit with the
UK in biopharmaceuticals as an indication “of the
significant need to negotiate a free and fair trade
agreement that eliminates non-tariff barriers and fosters
greater exports to this important market.”9 It called for
deepening of trade relations and promoted the use of
the recently negotiated US-Mexico-Canada Agreement
as a “very strong base from which to negotiate a trade
agreement with the UK.”9
However, it should not be assumed that all the
current objectives of the US government or drug
industry will be translated into a final agreement.
After protracted debate theHouse of Representatives
approved the excision of a key term from the recently
negotiatedUS-Mexico-Canada agreement thatwould
have assured a minimum of 10 years of data
exclusivity for newly approved biological
medicines.10
But there is no room for complacency. The House of
Commons European scrutiny committee has raised
concerns about whether ministers are enabling
adequate parliamentary, and by extension public,
scrutiny of their decisions, especially when vital
public interests such as health and healthcare
systems are beingdiscussed.11This ismore important
than ever when media attention is focused on the
covid-19 response; the government’s refusal in early
May 2020 to legislate to retain theEU’s food standards
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in any future trade deals received limited coverage in the UK.12
Based on what can be ascertained on the goals of the UK, the EU,
and the US, we highlight five concerns related to pharmaceutical
policy, safety regulations, and trade governance that have
implications for health and the NHS.
Undermining NICE
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in
England and its counterparts elsewhere in the UK have developed
systems for appraising the cost effectiveness ofmedicines and other
health technologies. Some commentators in the US, including the
industry’s main trade group, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), argue that NICE’s activities
create undue regulatory restrictions and costs—that is, “non-tariff
barriers to trade.” These commentators argue that such systems for
appraising the cost effectiveness of health technologies should be
eliminated. This is a logical extension of the US pharmaceutical
industry’s drive to constrain the use of economic evaluations in US
medicines approval procedures, enshrined in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act.13
We can also expect that, as in the Korean-US trade agreement,
PhRMA will demand “meaningful opportunities for input from
manufacturers and other stakeholders… both in the development
and the specific implementation of all relevant laws, regulations,
and procedures.”9 Such provisions could undermine the
independence of NICE.
Extending intellectual property protection
Another core priority for PhRMA is to prolong the period during
which brand namemedicines are protected from competition from
generic and biosimilar products. PhRMA has targeted the rules on
intellectual property protection, especially for new biological
products. Generic competitors for conventionalmedicines produce
an identical molecule after patents expire, but this is more difficult
for complex biological products. Competition therefore comes from
what are termed biosimilars, which are similar in structure and
effect to the original but whose development requires access to
detailed data on the innovative product.
PhRMA proposes that the US “should seek [intellectual property]
protections thatmeet thehighest international standards, including
at least 12 years of regulatory data protection ... for biologics.”9This
would prevent access to the data by potential competitors and is
already enshrined in US legislation. However, the protection is
longer than the maximum of 11 years in the EU and the eight years
in Canada and Japan—and indeed the five years for traditional,
chemically derived products in the US.
Even a single year extension could negatively impact access.
Importantly, PhRMA also argues that 12 years of regulatory data
protection should be the basis for all subsequent negotiations
between the US and UK and other future trading partners.
Weakening regulatory protection
PhRMA’s third priority, which at first sight may seem less
controversial, is the mutual recognition of certain regulatory
provisions, such as good manufacturing practice (GMP). Some
elements of GMP are currently aligned between the US and EU and
help to avoid unnecessary duplication. However, as the European
Commission concludedduringnegotiations on thenowabandoned
TTIP, “neither full harmonisation nor mutual recognition seems
feasible on the basis of the existing framework legislations in the
US and EU.”14
There are subtle but important differences between US Food and
Drug Administration and European Medicines Agency standards
for GMP. For example, EU regulations stipulate that facilities
manufacturing medicines for use in trials be inspected to ensure
they comply with GMP. They also require that facilities receive
authorisation to manufacture investigational medicinal products,
with a qualified person authorising release of individual batches
after checking that they meet criteria for release, including
adherence to GMP.15
Although we can only speculate about the health implications of
departing from the EU regulations, given that their aim is to
maximise product safety, it will be important to monitor the
consequences carefully. However, once any change is embedded
in a new trade deal, it will be difficult to go back.
Of course, a futureUS-UK trade agreement that aligned theUKwith
USGMPstandardsmightmake it easier for theUKbased life sciences
industry to access the US market. However, the corollary is that it
wouldmake it harder to complywith standards necessary to access
the EUmarket, putting at risk tradewith theUK’s closest neighbours
and threatening the domestic pharmaceutical industry.
Diverging at any cost
Other concerns do not relate specifically to US demands but to the
UK’s approach to future trade agreements. The UK’s approach to
negotiating with the EU states that “we will not agree to any
obligations for our laws to be aligned with the EU’s.”16
Given the dominance of the EU in UK trade, accounting for 45% of
exports compared with 19% to the US,17 it is unclear how this will
be achieved without doing severe damage to the British economy,
unless the word “obligations” is interpreted loosely.
However, the government’s stance is consistent with the approach
observed throughout the Brexit process to prioritise political goals
over economic and social ones, and sound bites over details. It is
intrinsic to international trade agreements to embody obligations
of regulatory alignment.
The precautionary principle, where safety must be established in
advance rather than being assumed until proved otherwise, has
been attacked. The principle has been described by the UK prime
minister, Boris Johnson, as “mumbo jumbo,” while the approach
adopted in the US, where safety is assumed until harm is proved,
has been promoted as a “science based” approach.18
The precautionary principle is often applied to chemical and other
potential hazards to prevent harmful human exposures and
environmental damage. By contrast, the US approach has been
associated with an increased exposure to pollution and other toxic
or environmental hazards, particularly for disadvantaged
communities, further exacerbating environmental inequities.19
Given UK ministers’ apparent preference for the US over the EU as
its main future trade partner, the UK may find itself abandoning
the precautionary principle.
Decisions behind closed doors
The importance of a potential US-UK trade agreement for health in
the UKmakes it essential that UK negotiators hear concerns raised
by the health community. Yet, British positions have remained
secret,20 despite the call by the House of Commons international
trade committee that the government “operate from a presumption
of transparency”.21
By contrast, the EU’s negotiating objectives for a future agreement
with the UK, published on 25 February 2020, were developed
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following publication of detailed documents on 3 February and
agreed by all member states.22 The UK’s response was issued on 27
February after a cabinet discussion with no consultation with
parliament,16 and the UK’s formal draft legal text of a future free
trade agreementwith the EUwas published on 19May, twomonths
after the EU’s.23
TheUK’s objectives for trade negotiationswith theUSwere also not
debated in parliament before their publication on 2 March 2020.24
Concerns have been raised about the level of secrecy agreed to by
the UK, including holding certain texts in confidence for up to five
years after concluding any deal with the US.25
Importance of scrutiny
Scrutiny in this case is especially important given that views may
differwithin the government. On the one hand,NHS executiveswill
seek to protect the health service from higher prices, and life
sciences research charities seek continued regulatory alignment
with the EU, seeing the bloc as amore important collaborative space
than the US. On the other hand, some prominent supporters of the
government’s life sciences industrial strategy supportmany features
of the US approach set out above, which they portray as a means
of promoting innovation.26
These differences reflect wider divisions between those who argue
that new post-Brexit trade partnerships are an essential route to
prosperity and economic recovery from the covid-19 pandemic.
Some call for a mitigated approach that balances economic
integrationwith a degree of social protection,while others prioritise
reducing the risk that stronger trading partners will be able to
impose their interests. These contrasting views can be expected to
have aheightened relevance in the context of the covid-19 pandemic
as governments are being forced to reassess how they can build
resilience and dependability in production while leveraging cost
savings and efficiencies through global outsourcing and trade.
Complex trade negotiations also require that those with technical
expertise have a seat at the table. The US Treasury has argued that
it should lead on negotiations on financial services, for example.
We do not know whether the UK delegation includes health or life
sciences industry representatives, or both, and, if so, how influential
theywill be. Howcanwebe confident that UKnegotiatorswill bring
appropriate stakeholder views to the table if we do not even know
what expertise is included in the UK delegation?
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